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Abstract
This paper addresses a number of issues related to
crude oil prices, focusing on Southern Africa. It
begins by analysing oil price movements from 1970
to 2008, and examines various factors that may
have contributed to the sharp rise and fall in prices.
A characteristic feature in the oil market is the time
lags it takes to react to price changes. A high oil
intensity of GDP makes the economy vulnerable to
oil price increases, so that countries with a high
oil/GDP ratio are harder hit than others. There are
two main issues for energy security: first, on
whether the potential use of the oil weapon can be
taken seriously; and second, how to minimize vul-
nerability to oil supply shocks by reducing oil
dependence and by a developing or enlarging a
strategic stockpile of oil. 
Keywords: oil price shocks, vulnerability, oil wea-
pon, strategic petroleum reserve
Introduction
The volatility in the price of oil the past four
decades reflects much more than the usual supply
and demand dynamics. Oil prices have been soar-
ing not because of any threats about oil depletion
but largely as a result of political factors and increas-
ing Chinese and Indian demand for oil, which all
combined, to make oil markets nervous. The peri-
od of cheap oil ended in the 1973. It came back in
the period 1986 to 1994. Oil’s dominant share in
energy use was largely because of the relative ease
with which oil is substituted for any other fuel in any
type of energy use. The direct effect of higher oil
prices is felt through the contraction of the economy
and its ability to restore the balance of payments
equilibrium. 
This paper addresses a number of issues related
to crude oil prices, focusing on Southern Africa. The
first section analyses oil price movements from 1973
to 2008, and examines various factors that may
have contributed to the sharp rise and fall in prices.
Under the impact of oil price shock in the second
section, the discussion is about the changing impact
of oil price shocks, and coping with higher oil
prices. In the final section, attention is on two main
issues for energy security: first, whether the poten-
tial use of the oil weapon can be taken seriously;
and second, how to minimize vulnerability to oil
supply shocks by reducing oil dependence and by a
developing or enlarging a strategic stockpile of oil. 
Oil price movements
Oil markets
Figure 1 shows actual price movements in the in the
crude oil market as well as wide fluctuations in the
price of Brent crude oil overtime. By mid-2008, the
oil price had risen to unprecedented levels, greater
than that recorded in 1980. For oil importing
Southern African countries, the impact of higher
prices depends on factors such as the length of time
the price rise lasts and the oil intensity of the econ-
omy, bearing in mind that the demand for oil is
price-inelastic in the short-term.
Figure 1: Oil price movements
Source: Data extracted from BP Statistical Review
(2009)
A characteristic feature in the oil market is that
consumers and producers usually take time to react
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to price changes. The long time lags, which account
for the slowness of the reaction to price changes,
arise mainly because: (i) market responses usually
result from long run price expectations rather than
current prices; (ii) switching from oil to other fuels
requires investment in new fuel-consuming equip-
ment; and (iii) substitution may require investment
in new supply and transport facilities. As a result,
the long run price elasticities are greater that short
run elasticities.
Explaining price spikes
1960 – 1973
Even after the founding of OPEC in 1960, crude oil
prices continued to fall up to the early 1970s. By
this time, large multinational oil companies known
as the ‘seven sisters’ – Exxon (Esso), Shell, British
Petroleum, Gulf Oil, Texaco, Mobil and Socal (or
Chevron) – dominated the oil industry. These com-
panies disposed of almost three quarters of interna-
tionally traded crude oil through their vertically inte-
grated systems (Robinson, 2001), smoothing out
fluctuations which would normally occur within
those systems. OPEC at the time was concentrating
on gaining greater control over its members’ level of
production, and was beginning to exert its econom-
ic and political strength. 
The decline in the price of crude oil, in real
terms, worsened in 1971 and 1972 with the decline
of the United States dollar. For Southern African
economies as well as other buyers outside of the
USA, a falling dollar lowered the local currency
price of oil selling at a fixed dollar price. The fall in
crude oil’s current prices coincided with the period
when coal prices were generally rising, resulting in
the substitution of oil products for coal and its prod-
ucts, both for energy and chemical use in many
countries, and when there was steady economic
growth with no severe recessions, and limited price
sensitivity of oil demand. Coal’s dominance had
largely been because of its convenience of use and
relatively low price. Favouring oil’s prominence, on
the other hand, was its flexibility of use, smoothness
in its supply and distribution system, and its impor-
tance as a ‘swing’ or ‘balancing’ fuel in the energy
systems of most countries. 
1973 -1978
OPEC, at this time, was more of a price follower,
meeting occasionally to agree on de facto prices
already realised in the market (Robinson, 2001).
Two different but interrelated developments seem to
have been the primary cause of price increases in
1973. First, were changes in property rights as oil-
producing countries with comparatively low dis-
count rates took over the production of oil from the
‘seven sisters’, which had abnormally high interest
rates because of anticipated nationalisation. The ris-
ing oil consumption and misguided fears that oil
would soon run out generated expectations of rising
crude oil prices. Second, at the same time, the oil
weapon (or an Arab embargo on oil exports) was
deployed against ‘unfriendly states’ in retaliation for
supporting Israel during the Arab-Israeli conflict in
1973. The targeted states were the United States, its
allies in Western Europe, Japan, Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe), and South Africa. Arab nations cur-
tailed production by 5 million barrels per day not to
reap economic benefits, but to achieve a political
objective. This demonstrated the problem of
dependence and vulnerability to oil supplies.
However, the oil weapon did not achieve its intend-
ed purpose as these states obtained their crude oil
supplies from other sources although at higher cost.
Thus oil prices quadrupled largely because of the
short-term elasticity of oil demand and in anticipa-
tion of further disruptions, leading to a rapid accu-
mulation of oil inventories. 
Because of the dependence of the industrialized
world on crude oil, oil price increases were dramat-
ically inflationary. It is interesting to note that for the
Japanese economy a major effect was to shift
investments away from oil-intensive industries
towards electronics industries. At the same time, the
crisis also provoked debate by ‘optimists’ and ‘pes-
simists’ on the nature of crude oil resources, led to
calls to conserve energy and to greater interest in
renewable energy and increased oil exploration,
and increases in the West’s dependence on coal
and nuclear power.
The shortfall following Arab curtailment of pro-
duction was met by increased production of about
1 million barrels per day in other countries, and the
net loss (of 4 million barrels per day) was extended
through March, 1974. Crude oil prices, in real dol-
lar terms, declined moderately from 1974 to 1978.
Oil consumption continued to grow, and the oil
price was sustained at a high level by the underly-
ing competitive forces and structural changes.
1979 – 1989 
The second price shock (1979-1981) was largely
triggered by supply cuts and panic-buying following
the Iranian Revolution and the ensuing Iran-Iraq
war. As with the 1973 energy crisis, the artificial
shortage of oil, rather than other factors, led to price
increases. OPEC increased oil prices by 60%
between January and June 1979, more than offset-
ting the 1975 – 1978 declines in real oil prices. The
world price of oil reached a peak of more than
US$90 per barrel. 
Interesting reasons account for the subsequent
decline in oil prices. OPEC did not remain the prin-
cipal force determining oil prices and output. By the
mid-1980s, OPEC countries had significant excess
productive capacity. This followed new discoveries
in and increased production from non-OPEC coun-
tries because of both higher oil prices and new tech-
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nology (Fattou, 2004). Although the quantity of
OPEC oil demanded was starting to increase, pro-
duction of some non-OPEC countries fell as price
collapsed in 1986. This reduced OPEC’s spare
capacity to very low levels. Saudi Arabia, the ‘sup-
plier of the last resort’, tried to increase its market
share by increasing its production. This combined
with cheating/chiselling on quotas by member states
and/or overestimation of demand for OPEC oil
exerted a downward pressure on prices and further
weakened OPEC’s ability to stabilise oil markets. 
1990 – 1998
The 1990 spike in the price of oil, caused by the
Gulf War, was milder and briefer compared with the
1973 and 1979 crises. During most of the 1990s,
crude oil prices fluctuated above $20 per barrel.
High price volatility is observable in 1990 – 1991
and during the Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998.
Crude oil prices fell during 1998 below the 1973
level because of slowdown in the growth of energy
demand worldwide and increases in oil supply. Oil
consumption in 1998 was lower than anticipated. 
1999 – 2001
Figure 1 shows that oil prices fell to their mid 1970
levels (in both real and nominal terms). In March
1999, OPEC countries pledged to cut oil produc-
tion with some non-OPEC members (notably
Mexico and Norway) pledging additional cuts in
exports. But not all of the quotas were observed
even though OPEC production fell by about 3 mil-
lion barrels per day. Prices fluctuated in the $25 to
$30 range in the first half of 2000, and continued to
display volatility. The three successive OPEC quota
increases did not halt price increases. Prices finally
fell with the November quota. Crude oil prices con-
tinued to decline in 2001 as global economic activ-
ity slowed and with growth prospects dampened.
Prices plummeted with the September 11 attack.
2002 – 2008
From Figure 1, the pronounced upward pressure on
prices from 2002 is attributable to strong world eco-
nomic growth which led to strong world oil
demand. Main drivers behind growth in oil demand
included growth in consumption particularly from
China, the US, and the Middle East, with China and
the US accounting for half of the world oil con-
sumption growth in 2007. While high oil prices
slowed economic growth in most countries, the
Chinese economy grew by 11.4% in 2007, reaching
its highest level in 13 years. Growth in Chinese oil
demand is attributable to its high rates of growth in
economic output and personal income. While high
growth in incomes and demographic changes have
resulted in increased demand for oil in the trans-
portation sector, increased industrialisation, on the
other hand, is driving the high demand for diesel,
petrol and petrochemical feedstock. Global growth
in oil consumption was stimulated by the decline in
the value of the US dollar which made oil less
expensive in terms of local currencies.
Prices increased further to US$ 70 by the end of
April 2006. Leading factors at play were the
upswing in demand propelled by industrialisation in
China and India, and prolonged shortage of spare
capacity to pump and refine crude. By September
2007, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) reached
$80.36 a barrel stemming from tension in Turkey
and the continued weakness in the US dollar. Prices
broke through the $100 price barrier in January
2008 exacerbated by further factors as follows.
First, the turmoil in Nigeria and Algeria and ten-
sions between the West and Iran raised questions
that supply would not keep up with rising demand.
Second, the falling US dollar put upward pressure
on oil prices as the purchasing power of the OPEC
barrel decreased. Crude oil prices remained
volatile, reaching a record high of US$147 by the
July 2008, adding to the global inflationary envi-
ronment. Worries about how energy prices were
affecting the global economy, added to worries
about the strengthening of the American dollar and
declining demand in industrialised nations. These
factors as well as continued fears over global reces-
sion caused oil prices to plummet, reaching $43.25
by mid December 2008. 
Impact of oil price increases
Changing impact of oil price shocks
In all, there are two periods of large sustained
increases in oil prices but with different economic
impacts, with the first period covering the first three
oil price shocks (1973/74, 1979 to 1980, and 1999
to 2000), and the second period from then on. The
first period is characterised by a combination of
inflation and recessions (or stagflation) following the
price shocks. Key issues behind stagflation were the
initial cost push inflation followed by expectations
formation of continued steep price rises which
became self-actualising. The rising prices meant
falling real incomes and declining demand.
Attempts to control prices using interest rates exac-
erbated the problems. The overall impact on
restrained GDP growth is predictable, given oil
imports become more expensive. High oil prices
were thus associated with slow economic growth,
increasing inflation, and rising unemployment. For
the second period, the ailments of the first period
did not appear. Instead, growth was sustained and
inflation was moderate. Variations in exchange
rates were not as great, and high oil prices were
associated with a decrease in government expendi-
tures and low interest rates (Alhajji, 2004). 
All the price shocks in the first period were asso-
ciated with conflict and substantial decreases in oil
supply. For example, substantial price increases
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were associated with: the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; the
1978 Iranian revolution; the 1990 Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait; and the run up to the American war in Iraq.
For the second period, there were several other fac-
tors that contributed to the upward pressure of
prices and increased demand for oil. Among these
were uncertainties associated with oil supply dis-
ruption in Iraq, production disruptions from
Venezuela, the decline in world inventory levels, the
sharp increase in Chinese imports, and a decline in
Japanese nuclear energy output which in turn
increased the demand for oil to replace it as an
energy source. 
Coping with higher oil prices
Except for Angola and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, which are net exporters of crude oil,
dependence on imported crude oil ranges from
95% (South Africa) to 100% (for the rest of the
countries), making Southern Africa very vulnerable
to price increases (Nkomo, 2006). Higher oil prices
increase the cost structures and worsen the terms of
trade of oil importing countries which have to pay
more per barrel of oil. With rising oil prices, prices
burgeon in most sectors of the economy as costs in
manufacturing, distribution and transportation
increase. A high oil intensity of GDP makes the
economy vulnerable to oil price increases, so that
countries with a high oil/GDP ratio are harder hit
than others. Indeed, the severity of the impact (on
the balance of payments, growth and welfare) of
higher oil prices will also depend on other factors
such as the country’s share of oil in the total energy
mix, and the monetary and fiscal response. 
A relevant question is whether to look for price
or quantity based policies in order to cope with
higher oil prices. Quantity based policies focus on
restrictions on the consumption of oil products.
Price–based policies, on the other hand, work
through the price mechanism, and are therefore
preferred for efficiency reasons. Price-based policies
entail provision of taxes, subsidies and measures to
reduce the domestic costs of supply of products.
Government can tax oil to account for its vulnera-
bility, or provide direct subsidies targeted to certain
fuels and indirect subsidies through reduction in
taxes on petroleum goods. Familiar objections to
using the market mechanism rest on equity grounds
rather than economic efficiency. Objections are
mainly on grounds of economic distribution effects
of the oil tax. To predict the effect of taxes on
demand, price elasticity estimates of oil demand
become vital. If, on the other hand, the preferred
policy option is to reduce reliance on oil, energy
efficiency improvements become important espe-
cially where such measures reduce oil intensity. 
Energy security issues arising from
rising oil prices
Oil weapon
There are often arguments that the degree of
dependence on oil imports makes oil-importing
countries vulnerable to use of oil as a weapon.
Following this line of thought, oil can be used as a
tool of retaliation or to get political concessions
against oil importing countries, raising fundamental
concerns about the security of oil supplies. The only
serious case of the use of an oil weapon was during
the 1973 energy crisis, where an attempt was to
wield it as a political instrument. As Mabro (2007)
observes, this remained as nothing more than a
public relations spin.
Several reasons account for the failure of the oil
weapon as an instrument. It is difficult for a seller to
isolate a particular importing country, and then wield
an oil weapon to punish, because oil is widely trad-
ed (Adelman, 2004). There is usually nothing bind-
ing for countries that do not fall under the embargo
to obtain and redirect oil supplies to those under the
embargo. More so, OPEC countries are usually not
agreed on production cuts. Even if oil exporting
countries cut back on oil supplies, supplies from
elsewhere would counteract any loss. The case of
sanctions against then Rhodesia and South Africa,
where oil was used as a weapon, revealed particu-
lar limitations in enforcing such measures. 
These arguments lend support to Mabro’s con-
tention that the oil weapon is a blunt instrument
that cannot be applied in a focussed manner or for
any sustained period. This weakens any worries
about the potential use of oil as a threat to security
of supply. While concern about security of supply is
valid, supply can be threatened by a host of poten-
tial events such as beyond the control of the
importer (for example, civil unrest in exporting
countries, etc), and this is different from the case of
oil as a potential weapon.
Oil dependence
Given the high dependence on imported crude oil,
reducing oil dependence implies reducing the oil
intensity of the economy if Southern African
economies are to be less exposed to high oil prices
and oil price hikes. Reducing oil dependence makes
sense if the economies increase their ability to sub-
stitute energy and other non-energy sources for oil
or by energy efficiency improvements. Since
demand is inflexible or inelastic in the short run
given the time required to change the oil consuming
equipment, oil dependence therefore means reduc-
ing vulnerability to oil dependence costs.
Many governments think they can reduce
dependence from a particular supplier by diversify-
ing sources of oil supply. The merit of the argument
is that increased reliance does not promote security
and economic threats stemming from oil depend-
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ence. But this does not mean that diversifying
sources eliminates threats to which consuming
countries may be vulnerable since oil price hikes
affect all economies regardless of sources of
imports. Oil independence will not shield any of the
Southern African countries from oil price shocks as
long as imported volumes are significant. In order to
enhance energy security, governments may pursue
policies that correct both competitiveness and cor-
rect market failures. Government intervention, for
example, is necessary to address any fear of oil
shortages. An expected intervention is in building
strategic petroleum reserves to be used during the
time of oil shortages, as long as the strategic
reserves do not replace commercial stocks. 
Strategic petroleum reserves
The purpose of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(SPR) is to reinforce energy policy and energy secu-
rity. A more focused SPR is used as a hedge against
economic impact of future short-term supply dis-
ruption, and is more effective than other response
measures such as demand restraint and fuel switch-
ing. This way, the SPR ameliorates supply crises
and combats any physical oil shortage that may
arise. The SPR is therefore best suited as an emer-
gency oil supply, when it can be tapped until sup-
plies are restored. South Africa’s SPR, with a stor-
age capacity of 45 million barrels, and Malawi’s
reserve facility to contain enough crude oil to
replace oil imports for five days (being expanded to
21 days), all indicate that by their size SPR can
ameliorate temporary disruptions but are not large
enough for long-term disruptions. 
There are some points to consider. First, the SPR
is not intended to be a buffer stock to affect prices
but to provide insurance against supply disruptions.
Given the size of SPRs in Southern Africa, using it
to dampen oil price hikes by releasing stocks at a
lower price cannot last long. The oil price would
revert to its previous level leaving the SPR empty
and unable to serve its intended purpose of com-
pensating a supply shortfall by releasing oil from its
stockpile. Second, the best time for starting the
strategic reserves is when prices are at their lowest,
as this brings down the cost of storage. Third, the
real threat in recent years has been more of price
spikes than supply disruptions
Finale
Increases in price throughout the period have large-
ly been the result of factors ‘above the ground’ and
not ‘below the ground’, and factors outside the con-
trol or influence of Southern African countries. The
problems, however, have had to do with geopolitics
rather than poor growth in the supply of crude oil.
Far from being an oil depletion signal, crude oil
prices have been high because of political instabili-
ty in some OPEC member countries, weaknesses in
the US dollar (oil is traded in dollars), and large
increases in demand from the huge developing
economies of China and India. The fundamental
control by OPEC producers still cannot be disputed,
since these economies are depended on oil export
revenues.
Just as with the 1973/4 oil price shock after-
math, there are now increased calls to conserve
energy and greater interest in renewable energy and
other possible energy substitutes. Southern Africa is
heavily dependent on imported crude oil and there-
fore subject to all sorts of vulnerabilities. Energy
security, in this context, should address the impact
of these vulnerabilities so that vulnerability to oil
shocks is also a function of strong commitment to
strengthen energy security
Note
The views  contained are those of the author and
do not represent the views of IDRC
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